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Abstract 
 
The aim of the collection is to contribute to an emerging tradition in the social sciences that 
incorporates attention to affect.   Rather than merely studyingfocus on effects, the isolatable 
and measureable outcomes of events and interventions, the papers assembled here offer 
different perspectives on the affective dimension of the meaning and politics of human-non-
human relations.   The authors begin by drawing attention to the constructed discontinuity 
between human and non-humans, and to the kinds of knowledge and socialities that this 
discontinuity sustains, including those underpinned by nature-culture, subject-object, body-
mind, individual-society polarities.  The articles presented track human-non-human relations 
through different domains of culture, including: humans/non-humans in history and animal 
welfare science (Fudge and Buller);, the relationship between the way we live,  and the 
effects on our natural environment as well as theand contested knowledges about ‘nature’ 
(Whatmore); choreographies of everyday life and everyday science practices with non-
human animals such as horses, meerkats, mice, , sea squirts and wolves (Latimer, Candea, 
Despret, Davies, DespretCandea, Latimer). The authors draw attention to the constructed 
discontinuity between human and non-humans animals and the rest of the natural world, 
and to the kinds of knowledge and socialities that this discontinuity sustains, including those 
underpinned by nature-culture, subject-object, body-mind, individual-society polarities.  
Each paper also goes on to offer different perspectives on the human/non-human not just as 
division, or even as an asymmetrical relation, but as relations that are mutually affective, 
however invisible and inexpressible in the domain of science. Thus the collection contributes 
to new epistemologies/ontologies that undercut the usual ordering of relations and their 
dichotomies, particularly in that dominant domain of contemporary culture that we call 
science. Indeed, in their impetus to capture ‘affect’, the collection goes beyond the usual 
turn towards a more inclusive ontology, and contributes to the radical shift in the 
epistemology and philosophy of science’s terms of engagement. However, in their impetus 
to capture affect the collection goes beyond a turn to a more inclusive ontology, and 
contributes to the radical shift in the epistemology and philosophy of science’s terms of 
engagement. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
According to Bruno Latour Ttheis outrage that greetsof any putting together of ‘animals’ and 
‘human society’ could happenwas made possible, according to Bruno Latour (2005), because  the 
meaning of the term social went through a process of shrinking. , since sociology was established 
as a separate discipline.  In what he calls the sociology of the social ‘we tend to limit the social to 
Formatted: English (U.K.)
Formatted: Left, Indent: Left:  0 cm
Formatted: Font: Bold, English (U.K.)
Formatted: English (U.K.)
Formatted: English (U.K.)
Formatted: English (U.K.)
Formatted: English (U.K.)
Formatted: Normal, Left, Indent: Left:
 0 cm, Tab stops: Not at  2 cm +  19
cm
Formatted: Body Text Indent
Formatted: Font: Bold, English (U.K.)
Formatted: English (U.K.)
 2 
humans and modern societies, forgetting that the domain of the social is much more extensive 
than that’ (Latour, 2005:6). In advocating a ‘sociology of associations’ able to account for the more 
heterogeneous nature of social actors and social links (see also Michael, 2000), Latour recalls the 
debate between Gabriel Tarde and Emile Durkheim in France at the beginning of the 20th century, 
a time when In advocating for a ‘sociology of associations’ that would be able to account for the 
more heterogeneous nature of social actors and social links Latour recalls  the debate between 
Gabriel Tarde and Emile Durkheim in France at the beginning of the XX century,  and how the field 
of sociology limited itself to the study of humans. Yet, as Mary Midgeley records, the tendency to 
banish animals goes back much earlier than to the period when sociology was establishing itself as 
a separate discipline:   
 
A generation ago, most academics would have been surprised to hear of a book with this 
title [Animals and Human Society]. Indeed, opinions in the learned world on this subject had 
not changed very much since 1787 when (as Maehle reports) ‘many people could not 
understand at all how it occurred to an author to write about such a topic’ (Midgeley, 1993, 
p. 186).  
 
According to Bruno Latour this outrage of putting together ‘animals’ and ‘human society’ could 
happen because  the meaning of the term ‘social’ went through a process of shrinking , since 
sociology was established as a separate discipline.  In what he calls the sociology of the social ‘we 
tend to limit the social to humans and modern societies, forgetting that the domain of the social is 
much more extensive than that’ (Latour, 2005:6). In advocating for a ‘sociology of associations’ 
that would be able to account for the more heterogeneous nature of social actors and social links 
Latour recalls  the debate between Gabriel Tarde and Emile Durkheim in France at the beginning 
of the XX century,  and how Durkheim was successful in establishing  sociology as the science of 
human society. Since that time the field of sociology has limited itself to the study of humans,  or, 
as Calvo argued ‘as something that emerges ‘through the symbolically constituted and 
linguistically mediated encounters and interactions through which meanings and representations 
are communicated from one mind to another in the course of human association’ (Scott, 2010: 16-
17, in Calvo, forthcoming). This idea has been shared and became dominant in classical sociology 
as denounced by a number of authors interested in human animal relations such as Fudge, 2002, 
Kruse, 2002, Alger, 2003, Twine, 2010. 
As with animals, so it is with other forms of the non-human. The all-pervasive interest in the 
human since the renaissance has over the centuriestime not only elided animals from much 
thinking about culture. It gave rise to a humanism thatand isolated ‘man’ and so other erased the 
presence of other forms kinds of the non-human from much thinking about culture and erased 
their presence as  integral to the nature of dwelling (see also Ingold, 1996). Teubner (2006) goes as 
far as stating that: 
After the scientific revolution, after philosophical enlightenment, after methodological 
individualism dominating the social sciences, after psychological and sociological analysis of 
purposive action, the only remaining plausible actor is the human individual. The rest is 
superstition. (p. 2) 
For all that sociologists and social theorists today have beenhave  turneding belatedly to the topics 
of the body and materiality, many agendas continue to be driven by such  humanistic perspectives, 
perspectives, that long predate Durkheim’s success in establishing sociology as the science of 
human society.  . The clue is in this emphasis on science. Aas at the same time as he attempts to 
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reinsert notions of collectivity to get us out of methodological individualism, Durkheim imports a 
foundation for the discipline that not even Weber in his turn to meaning – discussed later - was 
able to reverse. As Albrow (1990) shows us, even for Weber ‘the social’ includes only those human 
actions that express rationality and excludes human’s more ‘animal traits’, such as habituation and 
conditioninginstinct.  Albrow emphasises Weber’s inheritance of the Kantian division in ways that 
‘“set up a fundamental cleavage between nature and the world of human action, where the 
mind’s creative force was to establish goals and incite a striving for perfection’ (p. 149).   
Attempts to make animals stand up, or more generally get non-humans to speak as more than 
spokespersons for human interests, appear doomed to failure unless we also rethink the nature of 
science, social or physical, as itself a domain of culture.  
The concern for the contributors to this volume is thus not simply one  of denying human 
characteristics in a vain attempt to add ‘others’ back into a common denominator. Or of our 
throwing off general perspectives on the non-human that arebeing too anthropocentric, 
narrowingscorning  attention to the like of chimps drinking tea or parrots speaking.  Nor is it 
simply a matter of stripping away meaning as all too human, in favour of heterogeneity and the 
symmetry of Latour’s (2005) double contingency, by giving non-humans the status of actants with 
the capacity to act differently from how they are already known. It is more that the very basis of 
our anthropology that appears to limit  the horizons of science to a particular (and dare one say, 
peculiar) set of relations.   
. Aand with this narrowing of relations, expunge an interest in affect from understandings of 
science and technology.  
It is for such reasons that It is for such reasons that Donna Haraway (2003) issued her Companion 
Species manifesto: 
Cyborgs and companion species each bring together the human and non-human, the organic 
and technological, carbon and silicon, freedom and structure, history and myth, the rich and 
the poor, the state and the subject, diversity and depletion, modernity and postmodernity, 
and nature and culture in unexpected ways. (Haraway, 2003, p.4)  
Haraway’s agenda is far-reaching. While Haraway like Latour proposes attention to a new kind of 
heterogeneous idea of the social, and to a new kind of actor, the human-non-human hybrid, as 
‘associations’ between ‘beings’ (Latour, 1998), she also adds something that is radical.  Specifically, 
it is Haraway (2008) , brings inthat adds attention to the affective dimension of human/non-
human relations as a critical challenge to dominant knowledge practices.   Thisus bBringing 
humans and non-humans together involves, as Latimer and Birke (2009) argue elsewhere, a 
rethinking not just of a ‘politics of nature’, as Latour (2004) terms itthe politics of nature, but of 
the a ‘politics of culture’ (Latimer and Birke, 2009), in ways that might take us far beyond that 
already achieved by attention to gender or orientalism, or even technology.   
IAs n their different ways, each paper in the collection in their different ways explores , how the 
relations between the human and the nonhuman (including animals, microbes, tissues, air and 
water) affect processes and practices not just in the creation of socialities (Carter & Charles 2011a, 
b), but also in the production of scientific knowledge and understanding, is radical.  Affect is being 
understood here not so much in its modern sense, as emotion or sentiment but rather in terms of 
‘attachment’ on the one hand and being ‘moved’ on the other.  Rather what is being invoked by a 
turn to affect is attention to how shifts in action and meaning occur as a power effect, a power 
effect that flows from being moved. Here, there is an affinity between Tthe sense of affect being 
invoked and that which is emergent in social psychological explorations which thus contrasts 
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feelingemotion and affect, the former being individuated and the latter being both embodied and 
relational:  
 . . Where feeling is often used to refer to phenomenological or subjective experiences,  
affect is often taken to refer to a force or intensity that can belie the movement of the 
subject who is always in a process of becoming . . . Becoming is a concept that has been 
mobilised across the humanities to refer to the subject’s capacity to affect and be affected 
(Latour, 2004; Braidotti, 2002). Although affects might traverse individual subjects, for many 
scholars they undo the notion of a singular or sovereign subject. (Blackman and Cromby, 
2007, p.5) 
Thus the papers presented here stress attention to how, in scientific practices as well as in 
everyday life, it is also the human-non-human relations that are affective; it is these that move, 
incite, elicit and excite. Here then, with commentators such as Puig de la Bellacasa (2011), we are 
arguing for the importance of examining socio-technical assemblages as more than matters of 
interest, or even as a ‘politics of things’. Rather, we also want to press attention to how people 
and things are moved about, and even transformed, as matters of affect. T Here, then, taking 
account of the affective dimension of science is thus not a matter of simply reducing these affects 
to the status of ‘not mind’, as moments of precognition or non-representation (Thrift, 2007). This 
is ), because – as we go on to explore below in our discussion of Strathern and naturecultures -– 
affect signals a shift or alteration in attachment (in both senses of the word).  
To continue the point, humanswe can never get themselves are never out of culture;, all 
interaction, including dwelling itself, is to a certain extent ‘prefigured’ (Strathern, 1997) and no 
amount of reflexivity is ever going to ‘disembed’ us (Strathern, 1991)all interaction with others, 
human or non-human, are to a certain extent prefigured (Strathern, ***).  Hence t 
The impetus to capture the affective dimension of human-non-human relations and associations in 
scientific practices enables us to explore interconnectedness (and its corollary, disconnectedness) 
as more than functional, or strategic.  As such, our approachThis is not a matter of simply reverting 
to some kind of humanistic attempt to imnbue the non-human with the capacity for meaning.  
Rather it makes possible what Venn (2010) terms ‘the rejection of the anthropocentric divide 
between humans and animals, while avoiding species of sociobiologism, pre-formationism, 
geneticism and other monocausal paradigms’ (p.1). 
But to accomplish this rethinking of relations, it may not even be necessary to go as far as re-
incorporating cyborgs as cyborgs.  
What canisareare being ingcontested in ourthis turn to affect are the peculiarities inherited 
through the notion of ‘man’ that came into consciousness at the time of the Renaissance. This is 
the idea of man, heightened by Kant into a self-conscious, autonomous, individuated being – who, 
in the capacity for rationality was elevated above nature, and with it, other species, by his (sic) 
accounting to the self for the self. Yet, far from being so  
immaculate in its beingness, an island unto itself, selfdwellinghuman being is always aAs Munro 
(1996) after Strathern (1991), has pointed out, a matter of being not just in association, but self is 
always ‘in’ extension (Munro 1996, after Strathern 1991).. Selves are, attached – in both senses of 
the word - to materials and other beings through  our relations that are both partial and 
provisional. That these relations, in turn, may be implicit intangibleand invisible, as well as 
transitory, should not diminish the importance of these ‘attachments’ and ‘detachments’, much as 
wesome might be validated some and others deniedy othersin the paraphenaliaparaphernalia of 
science.  
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Just as Strathern (xxxx) noted kinship is a moveable feast in her study of Elmdon, so too do the 
materials alter and change that we draw upon in order to manifest self.   
EEven in their postulated mode of detachment, discussed below, what this shift to include 
attention to affect helps us to see is how scientists, whether they be social or physical scientists, 
are always in the process of being what Sarah Whatmore, this volume, expresses as ‘more-than-
humans’; and, commensurately, they – like the rest of us - act in a more-than-human world, 
including being positioned by socio-cultural politics. This more-than-human world is a world of 
materials as well as sentient beings, all of which need to be incorporated into the fold of a more 
inclusive humanismunderstanding of the social, including into understandings of how, and what, 
knowledge is produced.  
For all the general recognition that has accompanied the interminable deconstruction of Cartesian 
philosophies,Yet the politics of the particular culture with which this Special Issue is engaged – 
contemporary science – continues to thrives on a denial of much of its relations. Within science oOnly 
the mind’s relation to logic (super-scribed by mathematics) is generally acknowledged; a relation that is 
supposed to have the effect of elevating the scientist sufficiently to cut out all other relations and 
attachments.  
TFor all this said, contemporary analyses of scientific practices show an increasing dependency of 
the scientist on her or his instruments (to say nothing of their embeddedness in the laboratory), a 
dependency that casts this matter further into doubt. Indeed, science more and more looks liketo 
be more than assemblages of associations.  (see Davies and Whatmore this volume).  This is 
particularly so today when animals and non-humans, as is discussed later, cross over the subject-
object divide toand become the very instruments of the sciences, such as mouse models in 
genetics (Latimer 2013; see also Davies this volume) andor meerkats in ethology (Candea this 
volume), affected in ways that makes them more the effects of culture than of nature.   . 
Symmetrically, therefore, they help showindicate how a rethinking of culture has to be brought 
alongside a politics of nature.  
Symmetrically, therefore, any rethinking of culture has to be brought alongside a ‘politics of 
nature’, as Latour (2004) terms it. Engagement here would need to be as much about the conduct 
of humans, including scientists as social creatures [[bound together by their animality as much as 
they might be bonded together by ideas ]]] , whether they are scientists interested in the physical 
or the social world. Again, the stance being taken here is not so much a matter of anti-humanism, 
as is often presumed. It is rather a matter of science itself attending to the issues of power and 
domination in which they are entangled (Callon 1998).  
Thus tThe argument for several many of the authors in these pages is that understandings of 
power and domination need to be widened. Specifically, the authors look to science to include the 
kind of effects that are no longer directly attributable to overly narrow conceptions of the human. 
It is in this respect that this Special Issue offers an engagement with (post)human theory and 
research. Inasmuch as the research that follows stands as part of a more broad set of philosophies 
(Wolfe, 2010), calling attention to the persistent kind of premise that sets people apart from 
nature, we should be clear that the authors are not simply advocating posthumanism.   Rather, as 
the bracketing of the ‘post’ in the previous sentence signals, the papers assembled are both ‘in 
alliance and in tension with posthumanist projects’ (Gane and Haraway 2006: 140). They are in 
alliance with some of posthuman philosophy’s objectives in the sense that they exemplify the 
move to include the non-human as active in the creation of knowledge, as well as integral to the 
construction of worlds. This acknowledged, the papers seek to go beyond simply contesting the 
sense in which human difference is portrayed as qualitatively distinct, as belonging to a different 
‘social order’ as Durkheim had it; or even as Weber might think it, with a special destiny on earth 
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(Anderson 2001). In their impetus to capture affect, the papers go beyond either sociology of 
association or any turn to ontology (Woolgar and Lezaun, 2013). Rather, the radical move here is 
that attention to affect changes the terms of engagement to help deconstruct those dichotomies 
that rest on the polarizing of nature and culture, including subject-object, mind-body, individual-
society, human-non-human dichotomies. 
 
 
In what follows we situate the papers in their thematic contexts. The most prominent social 
philosophers of science with whom the papers engage are Despret, Haraway, Latour, Stengers and 
Strathern. We begin with exploring the connection and disconnection between nature and culture, 
moving on to ask “wither science”, and explore how human-non-human, nature-culture, can be 
reattached, including new scientific methodologies. We then go on to show the importance of 
taking materialities and human-non-human relations seriously, but as more than functional 
matters.  We finish with arguing for the significance of bringing affect back to science.  
 
 
 
Our alliance with posthumanism has much to do with what Latimer, this volume, calls bringing the non-
human ‘alongside’ the human.  Specifically, drawing on the work of Michel Callon, Vincianne Despret, 
Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers and Marilyn Strathern amongst others, the authors 
open up social science to new paths for understanding nature and culture. A first aim is to trouble the 
processes that help produce the above-mentioned techniques of detachment in the natural and social 
sciences, a distanciation that produces the figure of the flâneur – as if the ‘human’ can stand outside the 
rest of the natural world, disinterested and objective. It is when this relation of the human to the rest is 
enacted in science, as being at the heart of the scientific method, that the ‘anthropological machine’ 
(Calarco and DeCaroli, 2007, Agamben, 2004) is most at work. Yet the point is not only to help 
deconstruct the ‘humanist exceptionalism’ that is integral to the dichotomizing of nature and culture, 
animal and human.  Rather, the object of the various papers here is to foreground the non-human as 
participant in the worlds – scientific or otherwise - they inhabit and help construct. As with previous 
papers in Theory, Culture & Society (see for example, Ruddick 2010) Spinoza’s sense of affect is invoked 
by a number of papers as moments in which there is ‘an alteration in power by affectus’ and it is likely 
no accident that those interested in affect have returned to a philosopher dating back to a time before 
science became the dominant force in the expansion of knowledge. This is because affectus is defined 
by Spinoza as ‘the affections of the body by which the body’s power of activity is increased or 
diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections’ (Spinoza, 1994). Inasmuch 
as the reductionism inherent in Cartesian methodologies tends to cut the ‘whole’ into ‘parts’, the rise of 
science has contributed to an effacement of the very kind of attachments to which Spinoza is pointing 
with his term affections.  
Much has been said in the literature about the way in which science has focused on the ‘efficient’ 
cause and relegated Aristotle’s other three causes (material, set-up and final cause) to the dustbin. 
This is a straightforward consequence of the mode of reductive analysis, which (in breaking down 
the whole) ‘detaches’ each part from the other in order to form clear and distinct ‘simples’. Equal 
attention though might be given to an evisceration of the notion of affect from scientific language, 
whereby it is only the ‘effect’ of one part on another that is studied. In a circular fashion, since 
effects alone are understood to be measurable, this predilection is largely attributable to the 
importance of measurement in science.  
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The mode of detachment takes the subject-object division one step further through an all-
embracing denial of affect in the work of scientists. In what is tantamount to a ‘cutting’ of the 
network (Strathern 1996), the ‘true scientist’ is incited to banish all relations other than that of 
measurement. In ways that resonate with the discredited doctrine of logical positivism (which 
sought to banish meaning as metaphysics), the more positivist scientist is not only in hock to what 
can be measured, but holds out observations (measurements) as purified of any ‘subjective’ affect. 
Since it is only the objects in an experiment that are deemed to be movable, only the effects on 
the objects are measured. Paradoxically, the same objects are sometimes also discussed as the 
‘subjects’ of the experiment – as if the experiment has not only taken the place of sentient beings 
but becomes itself the prime mover.  
 
But the subject-object divide is of course not peculiar to science. Its origins lie more in a 
grammatical division in language between subject, which does the doing and object, to which 
things are done, including observation, experimentation and measurement. The division thus 
typically separates those beings accorded the honour to be sentient (generally those humans 
accorded the status of sovereign subjects) from those which are not (generally non-humans). 
Consequently, in a sleight of the English language, it is worth noting that objects are generally 
taken as being moved about by effects and only subjects – typically humans - are seen as subject 
to affect. However, the rise of science might have had as much influence in practice over usage of 
these twin terms.  
 
Re-connecting nature and culture 
In all this Tthe papers presented preserve some notion of the human. While the authors deploy 
different ways to help illuminate how humans are just one amongst many other kinds of living 
beings, they also note how their activities – including how they imagine their relationship to other 
kinds and to all aspects of the material world - have profound consequences. Critically, what each 
author addresses, is how the relation between nature and culture (and with this the human and 
the non-human) is enacted and performed as division and dichotomy. Such dichotomies prove 
inadequate for knowledge and understandings of sociality (see also Charles and Davies 2011), as 
well as mislead over how knowledge is produced inside the life sciences, social sciences or human 
sciences.  Indeed, as is discussed below, the epistemology-ontology relation that is complicit in the 
production of division and dichotomy is also inadequate for addressing the problems that face not 
just social science, but also more general understandings about how humans live in relation to the 
rest of the world they co-inhabit (see also, Venn 2010).    
This brings us to the primary invocation of our title ‘naturecultures’.  As Marilyn Strathern (1980), 
a leading anthropologist of science, advises, there are good reasons for avoiding perspectives that 
attempt to define either nature or culture as separable and distinct in themselves:    
 . . . there is no such thing as nature or culture, each is a highly relativised concept whose 
ultimate significance must ultimately be derived from its place within a specific metaphysics. 
No single meaning can be given to nature or culture in Westernized thought; there is no 
consistent dichotomy, only a matrix of contrasts. (p. 177) 
The aim of collapsing the dichotomy into one word is thus to suggest that nature and culture are 
not two different things, but a part of the same.  For example, an individual human is not the 
product of the interaction of nature (body, biology, genes) and culture (nurture, education, 
technology).  . What we are insisting on is that any human being is a site of natureculture.  
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The term natureculture was coined by Haraway (2003) as a provocation for collapsing and 
transgressing the dominant metaphysics that dichotomizes nature and culture, and through which 
culture and all that is human is constituted as discontinuous with the rest of the world. As 
Haraway points out nature cannot stand outside of culture, just as culture cannot stand outside of 
nature. This is because the meaning of nature – what we identify as natural - is not just 
determined by culture, but is also the result of specific historical, material and political conditions 
of possibility. What humans identify as natural (claims for instance that women are naturally 
caring or that people are naturally heterosexual) is an effect of culture, but culture 
naturalisednaturalized.  But we would like to go further here. 
While the meaning of binary has been elided with the idea of dualisms and dichotomies, we think 
that natureculture is better understood as a binary.  The term binary is from the Latin binarius, 
meaning having two parts.  A binary is thus characterized by or consists of two parts or 
components; a ‘twofold’. We like this idea of a twofold because it connects to Deleuze’s 
conceptualization of the fold, and how we are folded into different discourses and truth regimes.  
A binary is different from a polarity or dualism – a binary implies connection and interdependence: 
critically, a binary implies relationality.   For example, a binary star (Figure 1) is a system of two 
stars that revolve around each other under their mutual gravitation. So rather than nature and 
culture being understood as a dualism, we can think of it as a relation that works institutionally as 
well as discursively and substantively, that is as ‘natureculture’.  In a similar way we could think 
how human/animal is a binary, because as Latimer (this volume) discusses the idea of the human 
cannot be thought outside if its relation to the animal.   
 
Interconnectedness 
Another way of undoing the nature-culture dualism is the recognition that we are one among 
many elements in naturecultures.  Adopting this grounding for scientific practice does not mean 
for a moment that the nature-culture divide is not alive and kicking, exploited for instance to its 
limit in contests around environmental change and its causes (see for example, Uggla 2010).  
Rather, the group of philosophers advocating the collapse of the nature-culture divide claim to 
show us a way to knowledge that allows us to step into a new world, one which does not separate 
the social from the biological as can be seen in the epitaph from Donna Haraway’s (2003) 
companion species manifesto, and one that its advocates claim is epistemologically, ontologically, 
and politically more ethical.   
 
For example, Sarah Whatmore (this volume) is concerned to explore the importance of affective 
relations between different kinds, for their methodological as well as their ethical importance.  
Focussing on a flood management program in which she was a participant researcher, Whatmore 
emphasises how for Stengers good science is both politically and ethically grounded in specific 
practices.  These practices do not simply involve shifts from a scientific method; rather they 
involve reimagining science as an engagement in relations, relations between the human and non-
human elements in any given scientific endeavour.  This is because, as she states, ‘it is a mistake to 
posit humanity as somehow separate from, and/or existing prior to, the world of things; the 
human comes into being with this world’ (this volume page **).  Here, good science is not just a 
matter of humans being in relation to non-human elements as objects that he or she observes.  
Rather, it is a matter of recognizing, being open to and even promoting in any research design how 
these relations affect how and what knowledge is produced.   Thus any scientific endeavour is a 
matter of making explicit how different elements affect each other, as a form of becoming-with. 
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Whatmore also makes explicit the interested nature of science – that it is neither detached nor 
disinterested.  Rather, making explicit how the concerns and interests in which science is 
entangled, and which any scientific project helps constitute, helps science to become more 
reflexive about the worlds that their attachments and detachments, whether these are mouse 
models or the emotions of cows, bring with them (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012).  
   
Whither science? 
As already discussed, the term natureculture signals the current issue is concerned with the new 
philosophies that interrogate the discontinuities between nature and culture/human and non-
human embedded in contemporary everyday life and in science. These philosophies understand it 
is not enough to announce, in a moment of prolepsis, the end of science: 
But this was to be no more than a brief period of Euphoria, a golden age with no future, in 
which seeing, saying and learning to see by saying what one saw communicated in an 
immediate transparency: experience was rightfully science; and ‘knowing’ was in step with 
‘learning’. (Foucault, 2003: 117) 
At the same time as they do not stand against science, the new philosophies offer critiques of 
science as needing to change their orientation and outlook, by becoming for instance 
‘cosmopolitical’  (Stengers, 2010). For Stengers, cosmopolitics is a ‘planet eye-level’ (undated) that 
can help counteract the problem of turning modern science into technoscience, as a general 
model of objectivity, rationality and universality.  To this extent the papers collected here extend 
new understandings of the human-non-human relation (ontology) in the production of knowledge 
(epistemology) and in its application as technology.  
For example, in her paper Vincianne Despret (this volume) describes some of the ‘un-orthodox’ 
practices pioneered by Konrad Lorenz and adopted by ethologists such as Barbara Smuts (2009) 
and Farley Mowat (1981), who openly used their bodies for engaging with the animals they were 
studying. Despret calls these practices ‘affected perspectives’ that make explicit what is usually 
hidden: how the scientists’ bodies are affected and changed in their practices. The paper raises 
questions about how scientists mention or conceal their bodies in the conduct of their research, 
why they do so, how they ‘use’ them, and what ‘having a body’ means in relation to scientific work.  
Despret offers the thesis that using the body as experimental tool (either for a wolf’s diet of mice 
or for marking a territory with urine, as in the case of Mowat’s study of wolves) might help to 
change the questions asked about the animals scientists study.  Specifically, Despret unfolds a way 
of doing science that undercuts the usual option of keeping the objects of study intact as models 
of nature through methods of habituation, to show how there are times when it is important to 
become, partially and intermittently, not just with the animal, but to become animal.  She 
describes experiments in which the scientist does not just inhabit the animals world, as observer, 
but allows the animal world to inhabit them.  What Despret shows us is how the body and 
practices of the scientist, as they allow the animal world to inhabit them, is also treated as an 
instrument – with the affects of becoming animal observed, measured and recorded.    So that 
through switches in practices, there are switches in attachment – from being inside and immersed 
in the world of the animals being studied, to a world of science that makes sense of that 
immersion through application of its own kinds of belongings and practices – measurement and 
other modes of reporting.  But critically, as Despret stresses, the first mode is a method, one in 
which the scientist actively seeks to become with the animals and, critically, she shows how for 
them to affect her to help make her a member, requires participation in their world, not 
detachment.  Unlike in the usual representations of published science, this method is not then 
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erased, annulled by the second mode – that of reattaching to modes of science, rather it is made 
explicit as crucial to an adequate epistemology.   
There are two ways then in which this critical attention to science is of special importance to the 
dichotomization of nature and culture. First, the scientific method has been held out, globally, to 
be the only sure path to knowledge and representation. Its ubiquitous evidence base is thus taken 
to be the only firm ground upon which to intervene. For instance in the political imagination of 
Western governments, science gets blackboxed as Science with a capital S, with little attention as 
to what counts as good or bad science, either in terms of how it affects our dwelling in the world 
or in the sense of appraising its conduct more generally.  Second, ‘science’ is also the locus for the 
production of technologies for intervening in the world. Science, in its contemporary incarnation, 
is constituted by theorists like Latour (2004) and Stengers (2010) as deeply implicated in the 
invention of technologies with which to manipulate, intervene or enhance nature. Science in a 
sense in its detachment has got out of hand – it is no longer the science of Foucault’s 'golden age' 
cited above. Indeed, the technology-technology machine that science has become in many of its 
guises – and the interests that fuel its constant expansion - is identified over and over again as a 
juggernaut that is out of control.  
 
Breaching hybrids and wholes 
Examination of the scientific practices that underpin the complicity of this blackboxing and 
intervening is important then not least because science is not just another domain of culture. As 
already discussed, scientific practices are also the foundry in which human exceptionalism is 
fabricated and enacted as a specific relation between either culture and nature or human and 
non-human others. Science in the cultural imagination is no longer only dominant in the West; in a 
number of senses it is the harbinger if not the emperor of a capitalism that is rapidly going global. 
As the highest achievement of human endeavour – the epitome of human accomplishment – it 
represents itself as being as far from nature as it is possible to get. At the same time as its objects 
and materials are those that are made to stand for ‘nature’, our own as well as the physical world.   
Decidedly, in looking for a shift in the epistemology-ontology relation, and towards notions of 
what can count as ‘scientific’ methodology, Whatmore and Despret in their insistence on a 
‘becoming-with’ attempt to re-incorporate interconnectedness into the methodology of science. 
But those organizational practices that we call ‘science’ and in which non-humans are explicitly the 
focus, the papers by Buller, Candea, Davies, Latimer and Whatmore also each show how what gets 
enacted are very complex relations between the human and the non-human. They each unpick 
shifts that re-perform the nature-culture dichotomy and draw attention to the kinds of science 
that remain dependent upon asymmetries between subject and object, and human and non-
human. These approaches then do not simply observe scientific practices, they also set out to 
transform the relations between humans and the world that scientific enterprises perform.  
For example, Joanna Latimer, this volume, questions the implicit totalizing involved in simply 
pressing recognition of interconnectedness, being-with and hybridity.  In so doing she articulates a 
more nuanced position in her notion of ‘being alongside’. Latimer begins by exploring why it is so 
important to bring the animal into sociology, particularly as the prototype for most forms of 
Othering.  She reflects upon inquiries into the human and the animal for how they critique human 
exceptionalism, and suggests a movement toward an ontology of connection rather than division, 
that stresses the relation between human and non-human others.  She shows how in the new 
evolutionary biologies this connectivity, enacted in terms of shared substance, still manages to 
perform a hierarchy of values through which only some animals are brought into the fold of 
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humanity.  She explores a possible way out of this impasse as a way of doing human-non-human 
animal relations in terms of being-with.  Here, extending Haraway’s (2003, 2008) theory of 
Companion Species, Latimer critiques advocacy of ‘being-with’ as too totalizing and individuating. 
Drawing on her study of Olivia Musgrave’s sculptures of Aamazonian women and their horses, she 
goes on to offer a new ethical as well as existential understanding of human/non-human animal 
relations.  Drawing on the work of Marilyn Strathern, Latimer suggests how being-alongside (, as 
opposed to being-with), emphasises the partiality and intermittency of the connection between 
the human and the non-human; underlining in so doing, including how the human and the non-
human animal remainare different and always in tension.  Thus her focus is on how there are 
neither individuals (humans or non-humans) nor hybrids (companion species), but rather 
assemblages made up of intermittent attachments and partial connections and attachments.  Her 
philosophy captures how scientists can only ever partially (in every sense of the word) become-
with the animals they study. For instance, papers by Despret (discussed above), and Candea (this 
volume and below), show scientists switching from attachment to the animals’ worlds, back to a 
re-attachment to their own belongings of observation and measurement, even of their own faeces. 
These partial belongings are captured by the notion of being–alongside because it emphasises 
switches in ground, and expresses the limits and the partialness of any connection (also invoked 
by Whatmore’s paper) and of any sense of mutuality.  This sense of partial connection is also 
invoked by Whatmore’s paper. 
These philosophies proposed by Whatmore, Despret and Latimer of becoming-with and being 
alongside respectively, thus do not entail our standing outside or against science. To the contrary, 
the authors in this volume help us  us recallcall how we are never without science in our everyday 
lives, neither in terms of how we live, our own imaginaries and knowledge creations, nor in 
respect of those of the scientists we study. Rather, their engagement is with a reflexive project 
concerned to open new ontologies that help us rewrite the division between nature and culture 
and incorporate new ways of understanding the relations between the vitality of the material 
world and the human.  As already indicated this is to provoke a way of thinking in sociology that 
no longer dichotomizes the cultural and the natural (or the social and the material or the human 
and the non-human), but begins to take more seriously the idea that we live in and are a part of 
naturecultures. For instance, another leading anthropologist of science, Paul Rabinow (1992), has 
pressed attention not to the sociology of biology, as might be expected, but to how we need more 
than ever to think of ourselves and our futures in terms of biosocialities.  
To this end the papers also recognize that the ways in which relations are performed in social 
science mirror the dominant modes of ordering relations in the physical sciences, including all that 
they cut out (Strathern 1980) in both theory and practice. As well as focusing on the epistemology-
ontology relations in the sciences with which they are engaged, Candea, Despret, Latimer, and 
Whatmore (all this volume) press the importance – substantive and political - of scientists’ 
attending to their own methodologies and their attachments, including how their attachments 
sustain the economic and political machinery in which they are ‘entangled’  (Pallí Monguilod, 
2004; Stengers, 2010). This is not only to examine the kinds of knowledges and technologies 
produced, but also to reflect on how they themselves are rewriting relations between nature and 
culture, body and mind, or people and ecology.  The aim is to finds ways to become more (than) 
human (Whatmore this volume; Seaman 2007). 
 
Taking materialities seriously 
Insertion of the term ‘naturecultures’ also situates the Special Issue in a tradition of research that 
takes materialities seriously. This includes our own permeable, fragile materiality as bodies; bodies 
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which, as Latimer (this volume) insists, are always in extension with technologies and other non-
humans that, in turn, have their unintended as well as intended effects. The term natureculture 
thus helps to evoke an awareness of the dominant relations humans have had with the material 
world as at the same time it is intended to advocate a transformation in those relations. The term, 
natureculture, thus signals how humans – and everything that humans are and do - are always in 
connection with the other non-humans that make up the world at any one time. For example, the 
shift to the natureculture perspective lets us see, first, how there is no ‘nature’ that is not touched 
by what humans do as well as think and, second, that there is no part of being human that is 
unaffected by its material interaction with other materialities.   
The importance of deconstructing the nature-culture dualism is thus partly because of all the 
other unjust dichotomies and dualisms that flow from it, including iniquitous regimes of value and 
asymmetrical feminine-masculine dualisms that underpin gendered power relations (e.g. Braidotti 
2002). On the one hand we can see this natureculture relation expressed in theories of 
embodiment that attempt to collapse the mind-body or other inside-outside binaries such as the 
subject-object divide discussed below.  On the other we can see it expressed in examinations of 
dwelling that are opposed to dichotomizing human-environment relations. As Heidegger’s  (1996) 
notion of ‘standing in advance’ suggests, humans in modernity increasingly stand in a relation to 
(not with) nature. So much so that nature, including human nature, becomes a resource, to be 
known, mastered and exploited. Just as there is no aspect of human being that is not a part of and 
in connection with the material world, so there is no corner of the earth that is unaffected by the 
human (Adam 1997); from the icecaps to the rain forests, the effects flowing from human 
technologies travel over time and across space, going global, for example in the form of acid rain. 
Contemporary geology here goes so far as to name the impact that humans are having on the 
world’s ecosystems as the ‘anthropocene’ (e.g. http://www.anthropocene.info/en/anthropocene).   
In these ways the trope of natureculture performs a provocation, flagging up the need for new 
cosmologies, political and personal. As Despret, Whatmore and Buller each show in this volume, 
the current dominant relation between nature and culture performed across so many domains of 
science needs shifting. At the very least these papers, each in their different approach, signal ways 
to incorporate the idea that we inhabit what Bruno Latour (2004) calls ‘worlds in common’, worlds 
populated by human/non-human relations, and learn how to speak in the ‘language of dwelling’ 
(‘oikos-logos’) (p. 213).   
The need to bring science into democracy as a collective of human and non-human relations, is 
particularly apposite for science. Science is the domain in which the dichotomy between nature 
(animal and other non-humans) and culture (human) is most fervently enacted as a relation in 
which human knowledge of the world (and ways of representing it) affords humans the maximum 
means to develop technologies for intervening.  The pinnacle of culture is thus seen – from this 
perspective - in this relation between nature and culture: the one in which scientific knowledge 
supports the development of technologies with which to master nature and enhance human being.  
Just think of Kubrick’s image in 2001 Space Odyssey, where the ape-man finds the long bone and 
turns it into a technology, as an image of the dawn of a technoscientific culture, ours.   
To this endhus the question mark after the term naturecultures in our title also indicates that 
several of the papers are asking how the relation between the human and the non-human is being 
accomplished inside different domains that are explicitly entangled by scientific discourses. In this 
respect the ethnographies which make up the papers in the Special Issue hold contemporary 
scientific practices against the social philosophies that advocate attention to the non-human as 
participants, and of humans as needing to open up to their affects.   
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The two papers by Matea Candea (this volume) and Gail Davies (this volume) help elaborate the 
complexity here in terms of very different spaces and organizational forms of science.  Candea 
presents ethnography of an ethology field station, one where the animals are meerkats, who are 
trained one moment to participate in an experiment over food, and then observed the next as 
creatures in their natural habitat, merely habituated to the presence of humans.   Thus the 
ethologists in Candea’s paper are one minute in a relation of collaboration with meerkats, and the 
next in one of detached observation.  These shifts show that each mode of connecting and relating 
to the objects of science is partial, and intermittent, but are made invisible in the production of 
knowledge about meerkats as exemplifying a specific kind of animal behaviour.  These shifts in 
ground make manifest different kinds of relations, including how different modes of doing science 
affect both ways of being with non-human others as well as who or what those non-human others, 
literally as well as figuratively, become.  
Davies shows how in her study inbred mice, and their genetically altered offspring, have attained a 
very special universality, with their adoption into international scientific networks as ‘an ordinary 
commodity in the exchange circuits of transnational capital [...] a scientific instrument for sale like 
many other laboratory devices’ (Haraway, 1997: 79)’ (this issue, page ***). This is a particular way 
of what Haraway has called ‘becoming worldly’, as mice developed in one laboratory become 
standardized technical tools that move from research centreers to specialised laboratory suppliers, 
to become the patented property of international biotechnology. In Davies’ account, ‘Mice are 
part of the story through which biology becomes molecular, genetic life commodified and genetic 
explanations fetishized’ (this volume, page **). However Davies’ paper also shows how these non-
human others, these laboratory mice, affect scientific knowledge in ways that create a profound 
imbroglio in biomedical research practices.  Specifically, thatIn particular there are spontaneous 
mutations in the mouse house, figured in scientists’ and technicians’ stories as deviant, mutant, 
virgin, and rogue mice, and s. She shows how technicians and scientists deal with these 
unexpected creatures in their work.  Davies explores when the animal caretakers are able to see 
the biological potential of the mice, and how the new guests in the mouse house facilitate the 
emergence of a useful new strain of research animal; and when the caretakers do not see these 
mutant mice as having potential because they have no interesting new features, and are killed.  
Davies relates these two ways of dealing with the unexpected to different forms of organization. 
In this way, she illuminates how the non-human isare affected by, and when they affect, the 
research.  Stengers and Latour both articulate this in terms of ‘good’ scientific practices that 
address and make visible how and when the so-called ‘objects’ of science object (Pallí Monguilod, 
2004), in the sense of making an objection, to the experiments they are a part of, and through 
which the scientists’ are affected and their understandings, even their modes of experimentation, 
are transformed.  
These papers thus help illuminate that scientists and the non-human others with whom they are in 
association are never simply engaged in the making of one world together in any particular 
endeavour, but alter between different worlds which have different demands and different logics.  
These shifts affectalter the figuring of both the objects of science as well as the character of 
science itself.   What emerges, then, through both Davies’ study of mouse models and Candea’s 
study of meerkats at an ethology field station, is not simply one way of doing relations between 
scientists and the non-humans in their projects, but shifts, shifts that hide how scientists and 
animals become differently from how they are usually depicted.   
 
Reattaching Science  
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As we can be seen from the papers discussed so far, a second and further aim of the collection is 
to bring to the fore how scientists are not just interested in but concerned with and by the non-
humans in their worlds: that they have to be attached and affected, in order for their experiments 
to work, not all the time but some of the time.  So what the papers in this volume address is the 
need not just to open up social science to thinking with the non-human, but the need to reimagine 
and explore the kinds of worlds that are created by how the division between the human and the 
non-human, scientists and their objects, culture and nature are enacted and performed inside 
scientific endeavours for the kinds of knowledge produced. This is important politically and 
ethically, philosophically and practically.   
As others have shown ‘nature – culture’ is not performed as a binary but as a key dualism that is 
implicated in all the other key divisions underpinning flows of power, including the asymmetrical 
relation between the human and the non-human (Callon, 1986).  Thus the nature-culture/non-
human-human dichotomy or dualism does not just make us epistemologically impoverished, 
blinding us to knowledge and understanding, it is the foundation from which processes of 
exclusion flow, and upon which the ‘attitude’ (Foucault 1984) to the ‘non-human’ is founded; an 
attitude that figures the non-human, such as the mice in Davies’ study, as resource, and as 
available to mastery (Heidegger 1986) in ways that legitimate its exploitation. The scenario is set 
for what Latour (2004) has called a politics of nature, including an ‘ideology of conquest and 
domination towards nature’ (Pattberg, 2007: 1).  
At the heart of the different philosophies of ‘being-with’, ‘becoming-with’, and ‘being alongside’, 
mentioned earlier, is a challenge to the scientific attitude of detachment and, with this, an attempt 
to reverse the exclusions brought about by the subject-object divide. In this respect, a third 
purpose of this Special Issue is to focus on the issue of affect, especially where other sentient 
beings (such as non-human animals and the worlds that they make) are brought alongside humans 
in the creation of knowledge. For all recent attention to the place of the non-human in the 
ordering of social relations is bringing about better understandings of how different human and 
non-human elements are assembled into complex socio-political associations (Latour 2010), it is 
fair to say the focus has been largely on technologies and other materialities. It is only with 
difficulty that more intangible aspects of relations, such as concern, otherness and affect, get re-
admitted to understandings of assemblages and their effects.  
For social theory and methodology, as Verran (2009: 11) argues, this step means that it is not 
enough simply to attend, with, for example, actor network theory, to the place of the non-human 
in the ordering of relations, as a ‘politics of things’. Rather, Verran helps us to see that the 
principles of science need to be extended beyond its own flat ontology, by attending to the 
metaphysical, particularly the moral forms, embedded in and reproduced by specific forms of 
knowledge practice.  There are different ways in which this can be done, for example by attending 
to what it is that scientists care for (Latimer and Puig de la Bellacasa 2013). It is through an ‘ontic 
politics’ that the boundaries of inclusion can be opened to the relational practices through which 
some things rather than others come into existence. In Verran’s case disconcertment, those 
moments when things feel wrong and unsettling, is an essential part of doing good (ethically, 
epistemologically) research (see also Law 2010). Krarup and Blok (2011), in also aiming to extend 
actor network theory, press for the inclusion of what they designate as ‘quasi-actants’, those non-
empirical or virtual elements, such as symbolic and moral forms, that have affects on how any 
form of organizing is done.   
The upshot is to make explicit how scientific practices perform the human and better examine the 
consequences that flow from how the relation between the human and the non-human is being 
constructed. Here Erica Fudge (this volume) beautifully describes the historical slippage of the cow, 
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from a being with a face, to a resource, effaced and without dignity.  Fudge addresses the 
constructed discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals by referring to the 
‘facelessness’ of animals in Western philosophy and modern science (Bacon) because ‘a face is 
where the rationality that lies within is projected out into the world, and here there is no reason 
to project and so no face’. As Fudge goes on  ‘Lack of reason means lack of face, means lack of 
individuality, lack of home, which in turn means that these beings are outside of full ethical 
consideration.’ (This volume, page **). In the examined wills Fudge uncovers the clues, such as the 
naming of specific animals, that might be intimations of a different type of relation between 
human and nonhumans, one in which nonhuman animals might have been considered subjects 
with a ‘face’, entitled to ethical considerations. Thus by giving animals a face, by individuating 
them as subjects, they can be reincluded in the fold of humanity 
The ‘effacement of the face’ (Bauman, 1990) of farm animals is also a theme present in Buller’s 
paper. But for Buller, in contrast to Fudge, for Buller giving an animal a (humanized) face is a part 
of the problem.  He argues that simply giving animals an individuated identity is an effect of the 
anthropological machinery of animal welfare science.  Specifically, Buller points out how the 
‘singular ‘farm’ is increasingly a place of ever‐greater multitudes, a deceptive and porous whole 
that is, in so many ways, very much less than the sum of its constituent parts’ (this volume, page 
**). His analysis of the industrialization of animal farming and the problems emerging from the 
ever greater number of animals kept for food production (Fraser, 2006) is linked to the rise of the 
public concern for the welfare of farmed animals and the development of animal welfare science. 
Buller proposes a critique of the recent ‘feeling’ approach in animal welfare science (see Duncan, 
2004) that is based on an appraisal of the emotional state (e.g. happiness, fear, boredom) of 
individual animals.  He points out how this approach, that is met with favour by the public (see 
Miele 2011) is too individuating.  It is also for Buller a decoy that obfuscates the need to 
investigate animal ‘collectivities’, and the very conditions of life of the ever-larger flocks of 
chickens, herds of cows or ‘cities’ of salmons, and how their ‘wants’ or ‘feelings’ are emerging 
from the interaction between them and the environment in which they live.  Buller concludes that: 
..these ‘animals’ wants’ (as opposed to ‘needs’) are increasingly being understood as socially 
contextualised, rather than purely individual yet they are not only increasingly denied within 
modern animal husbandry practice but also escape scientific investigation and consideration. 
(this volume page **) 
 
Taking materialities seriously 
Insertion of the term ‘naturecultures’ in the title of this editorial also situates the Special Issue in a 
tradition of research that takes materialities seriously. This includes our own permeable, fragile 
materiality as bodies; bodies which, as Latimer (this volume) insists, are always in extension with 
technologies and other non-humans that, in turn, have their unintended as well as intended 
effects. The term natureculture thus helps to evoke an awareness of the dominant relations 
humans have had with the material world as at the same time it is intended to advocate a 
transformation in those relations. The term, natureculture, thus signals how humans – and 
everything that humans are and do - are always in connection with the other non-humans that 
make up the world at any one time. For example, the shift to the natureculture perspective lets us 
see, first, how there is no ‘nature’ that is not touched by what humans do as well as think and, 
second, that there is no part of being human that is unaffected by its material interaction with 
other materialities.   
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The importance of deconstructing the nature-culture dualism is thus partly because of all the 
other unjust dichotomies and dualisms that flow from it, including iniquitous regimes of value and 
asymmetrical feminine-masculine dualisms that underpin gendered power relations (e.g. Braidotti 
2002). On the one hand we can see this natureculture relation expressed in theories of 
embodiment that attempt to collapse the mind-body or other inside-outside binaries such as the 
subject-object divide discussed below.  On the other we can see it expressed in examinations of 
dwelling that are opposed to making human-environment relations binary. As Heidegger’s  (1996) 
notion of ‘standing in advance’ suggests, humans in modernity increasingly stand in a relation to 
(not with) nature. So much so that nature, including human nature, becomes a resource, to be 
known, mastered and exploited. Just as there is no aspect of human being that is not a part of and 
in connection with the material world, so there is no corner of the earth that is unaffected by the 
human (Adam 1997); from the icecaps to the rain forests, the effects flowing from human 
technologies travel over time and across space, going global, for example in the form of acid rain.   
In these ways the trope of natureculture performs a provocation, flagging up the need for new 
cosmologies, political and personal. As Despret, Whatmore, and Buller each show in this volume, 
the current dominant relation between nature and culture performed across so many domains of 
science needs shifting. At the very least these papers, each in their different approach, signal ways 
to incorporate the idea that we inhabit what Bruno Latour (2004) calls ‘worlds in common’, worlds 
populated by human/non-human relations, and learn how to speak in the ‘language of dwelling’ 
(‘oikos-logos’) (p. 213).   
The need, articulated by Latour as the need to bring science into democracy as a collective of 
human and non-human relations, is particularly apposite for science. Science is the domain in 
which the dichotomy between nature (animal and other non-humans) and culture (human) is most 
fervently enacted as a relation in which human knowledge of the world (and ways of representing 
it) affords humans the maximum means to develop technologies for intervening.  The pinnacle of 
culture is thus seen – from this perspective - in this relation between nature and culture: the one 
in which scientific knowledge supports the development of technologies with which to master 
nature and enhance human being.  Just think of Kubrick’s image in 2001 Space Odyssey, where the 
ape-man finds the long bone and turns it into a technology, as an image of the dawn of a 
technoscientific culture, ours.   
Yet the question mark after the term naturecultures in our title also indicates that several of the 
papers are asking how the relation between the human and the non-human is being accomplished 
inside different domains that are explicitly entangled by scientific discourses. In this respect the 
ethnographies which make up the papers in the Special Issue hold contemporary scientific 
practices against the social philosophies that advocate attention to the non-human as participants, 
and of humans as needing to open up to their affects. This set of ethnographies cover, variously, 
the ethology field station (Candea), ecology (Whatmore), the genetics laboratory (Davies), 
evolutionary biology (Latimer), and the modern farm organized by the alignment between 
industrial methods and welfare-science (Buller). 
 
 
Bringing affect back into science 
A  thirdfourth aim of this set of papers is to trouble the processes that help produce the above-
mentioned techniques of detachment in the natural and social sciences, a distanciation that 
produces the figure of the flâneur – as if the ‘human’ can stand outside the rest of the natural 
world, disinterested and objective. It is when this relation of the human to the rest is enacted in 
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science, as being at the heart of the scientific method, that the ‘anthropological machine’ (Calarco 
and DeCaroli, 2007, Agamben, 2004) is most at work. Yet the point is not only to help deconstruct 
the ‘humanist exceptionalism’ that is integral to the dichotomizing of nature and culture, animal 
and human. Rather, the object of the various papers here is to foreground the non-human as 
participant in the worlds – scientific or otherwise - they inhabit and help construct.  
Yet tThe subject-object divide that lies at the heart of much humanism is of course not peculiar to 
science. Its origins lie more in a grammatical division in language between subject, which does the 
doing and object, to which things are done, including observation, experimentation and 
measurement. The division thus typically separates those beings accorded the honour to be 
sentient (generally those humans accorded the status of sovereign subjects) from those which are 
not (generally non-humans). Consequently, in a sleight of the English language, it is worth noting 
that on the one hand objects are generally taken as being moved about by effects and on the 
other only subjects – typically humans - are seen as subject to affect.  
This acknowledged, the rise of science maymight have had as much influence in practice over 
common usage of these twin terms, almost erasing its difference in meaning in much discourse. 
Hence it is surely no accident that those interested in affect have returned to a philosopher dating 
back to a time before science became the dominant force in the expansion of knowledge? As with 
previous papers in Theory, Culture & Society (see for example, Ruddick 2010) Spinoza’s sense of 
affect is invoked by a number of papers as moments in which there is ‘an alteration in power by 
affectus’. This is because affectus is defined by Spinoza as ‘the affections of the body by which the 
body’s power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of 
these affections’ (Spinoza, 1994). Inasmuch as the reductionism inherent in Cartesian 
methodologies tends to cut the ‘whole’ into ‘parts’, the rise of science has contributed to an 
effacement of the very kind of attachments to which Spinoza is pointing with his term affections. 
This point needs some further comment. 
Much has been said in the history of science about the way in which science focused on the 
‘efficient’ cause and has relegated Aristotle’s other three causes (material, set-up and final cause) 
to the dustbin. This has been seen as a straightforward consequence of the mode of reductive 
analysis, which (in breaking down the whole) ‘detaches’ each part from the other in order to form 
clear and distinct ‘simples’. Equal attention, though, might be given to an evisceration of the 
notion of affect from scientific language, whereby it is only the ‘effect’ of one part on another that 
is studied – much as Hume detailed one billiard ball being moved about by another. This 
predilection is largely attributable, in a circular fashion, to the importance of measurement in 
science – since it is effects alone that are deemed to be measurable.  
Contrastingly, affect, where it is used at all, typically indexes the holism of an overall reaction; a 
state in which someone feels ‘turned over’ rather than just merely turned around. Indeed, in 
following up this idea, Munro and Belova (20089) suggest there is an immanent if momentary loss 
of narrative in the body and go so far as to suggest affect is where ‘world’ is changed. 
: 
 Xxxxx 
  
The very idea of the experimenter being ‘turned over’ is clearly an anathema to science. Hence the 
idea of affect has long been treated as an aberration (particularly so since it was mistakenly 
assumed to occur only in sentient beings – the subject side of the subject-object divide). Affect 
implies a temporary loss of sovereignty, even rationality; and so becomes the enemy of science. 
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Thus to go further than Latour, as discussed in the introduction, it is not just heterogeneity that is 
expunged from understandings of how science is done, what is also expunged from 
understandings of science and technology is an interest in affect. Specifically, attention to affect 
allows us to bring into view how the relations between the different elements of any scientific 
endeavour are never only objective or functional.  Rather attention to affect helps us bring into 
view the ways in which each element acts on the other, to be moved, and even transformed.   
Making explicit how scientists are affected by the non-humans and quasi-actants that make up the 
worlds they inhabit, and vice versa, troubles the basic premisses upon which science operates. For 
example, the ethologists in Candea’s paper are one minute in a relation of collaboration with 
meerkats, and the next in one of detached observation of the same meerkats that their 
experiment has transformed. These partial connections, attachments and detachments are also 
captured by Latimer’s notion of being–alongside, because it expresses the limits and the 
partialness of any connection and of any sense of mutuality. By attending to the affective, 
distributed and heterogeneous nature of scientific endeavour what gets unconcealed are those 
aspects of knowledge practice that in the mode of ordering we call science are usually 
inexpressible and invisible, and cut out of how science is understood and performed.  
 
Crossing the subject-object divide   
In the stress on ‘objectivity’, measurement procedures in science open up a front door whereby 
those humans who do not conform to scientific protocols are taken to be ‘irrational’ and passed 
over to the other side of the subject-object divide, thus becoming ‘objects’ of study for the human 
sciences. Yet, if on a somewhat different token, measurement also opens up the back door 
through which non-humans cross over the subject-object divide. In an enslavement to their 
instruments and their tried and test protocols, scientists are bound by their conventions to go with 
the measurements, it is not the scientists that first register and record but their instruments – the 
non-humans that are seen to be aligned on the same side of the subject-object divide as the 
scientists.  
These procedures might cause little reflection but for the fact that increasingly, in fields such as 
genetic biomedical research, it is sentient beings – animals going ahead of humans – that have 
become the instruments. Here, Davies and Candea as we have seen both describe how different 
scientists’ ‘model’ animals, to a greater and lesser extent, so that the animals are in turn affected 
by culture (to a greater or lesser extent). As such they can no longer stand for nature. But these 
same animals (genetically engineered mice, and collaborative meerkats) then become the 
instruments through which scientific experiments are conducted, but with the trace of their 
humanization erased (Derrida 1978). Thus scientists switch between the making of their animals fit 
for their experiments and the re-inclusion of the animal as scientific instrument.  Without wishing 
to labour the point, even in the so-called hard sciences of biology and chemistry, the registers of 
affect have been busy re-entering by the back door. Elsewhere in her study of genetic medicine 
Latimer (2013) explores this motility in the subject-object divide.   
YetBut, as Candea (this volume) helps remind us, though further switches in ground, the objects of 
science are not the materials and creatures that the scientists employ and study in their 
experiments.  The materials and creatures scientists use in their experiments are constituted 
discursively as models and instruments, employed in experiments to help extend, confirm or 
refute particular puzzles, hypotheses and theories: it is the puzzles, the theories and the 
hypotheses themselves that are science’s objects.  What he shows is how the instruments, the 
meerkats, also have to become participants for the experiment.   
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What these new ontologies explored in this Sspecial Iissue thus provoke is attention to how the 
creatures and the instruments are not just that, instruments, but participants in the worlds of 
knowledge that they inhabit in ways that affect the knowledge produced because they affect what 
the humans think and do.   
In this way the mode of detachment takes the subject-object division one step further thant is 
usually noted. Its all-embracing denial of affect in the work of scientists is tantamount to a ‘cutting’ 
of the network (Strathern 1996); the ‘true scientist’ is incited to banish all relations other than that 
of measurement. In ways that resonate with the discredited doctrine of logical positivism (which 
sought to banish meaning as metaphysics), the more positivist scientist is not only in hock to what 
can be measured, but holds out observations (measurements) as purified of any ‘subjective’ affect. 
Since it is only the objects in an experiment that are deemed to be movable, only the effects on 
the objects are to be measured. Paradoxically, the same objects are sometimes also discussed as 
the ‘subjects’ of the experiment – as if the experiment has not only taken the place of sentient 
beings but becomes itself the prime mover.  
 
 
 
 
Whither science? 
As already discussed, the term natureculture signals the current issue is concerned with the new 
philosophies that interrogate the discontinuities between nature and culture embedded in 
contemporary everyday life and in science. These philosophies understand it is not enough to 
announce, in a moment of prolepsis, the end of science: 
But this was to be no more than a brief period of Euphoria, a golden age with no future, in which seeing, 
saying and learning to see by saying what one saw communicated in an immediate transparency: 
experience was rightfully science; and ‘knowing’ was in step with ‘learning’. (Foucault, 2003 
[1963]: 117) 
At the same time as they do not stand against science, the new philosophies offer critiques of science as 
needing to change their orientation and outlook, by becoming for instance ‘cosmopolitical’  
(Stengers, 2010). They also extend to new understandings of the human-non-human relation 
(ontology) in the production of knowledge (epistemology) and in its application as technology, as 
well as in the production of technologies and their affects.  
There are two ways in which this critical attention to science is of special importance to the 
dichotomisation of nature and culture. First, the scientific method has been held out, globally, to 
be the only sure path to knowledge and representation. Its ubiquitous evidence base is thus taken 
to be the only firm ground upon which to intervene. For instance in the political imagination of 
Western governments, science gets blackboxed as Science with a capital S, with little attention as 
to what counts as good or bad science, either in terms of how it affects our dwelling in the world 
or in the sense of appraising its conduct more generally.  Second, ‘science’ is also the locus for the 
production of technologies for intervening in the world. Science, in its contemporary incarnation, 
is constituted by theorists like Latour (2004) and Stengers (2010) as deeply implicated in the 
invention of technologies with which to manipulate, intervene or enhance nature. Science in a 
sense has got out of hand – it is no longer the science of Foucault’s 'golden age' cited above. 
Indeed, the technology-technology machine – and the interests that fuel this constant expansion - 
is identified over and over again as a juggernaut that is out of control.  For this reason 
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investigations into science are particularly welcome that advocate attention to how the relation 
between the human and the non-human gets enacted and done inside science (particularly in 
terms of how the ‘natural world’ is imagined in any particular scientific enterprise).  
Examination of the scientific practices that underpinlie the complicity of this blackboxing and 
intervening is important not least because science is not just another domain of culture. As 
already discussed, scientific practices are also the foundry in which human exceptionalism is 
fabricated and enacted as a specific relation between either culture and nature or human and 
non-human others. Science in the cultural imagination is no longer only dominant in the West; in a 
number of senses it is the harbinger if not the emperor of a capitalism that is rapidly going global. 
As the highest achievement of human endeavour – the epitome of human accomplishment – it 
represents itself as being as far from nature as it is possible to get. At the same time as its objects 
and materials are those that are made to stand for ‘nature’, our own as well as the physical world.   
The most prominent social philosophers with whom the papers that follow engage are Despret, 
Haraway, and Stengers. Decidedly, in looking for a shift in the epistemology-ontology relation, and 
towards notions of what can count as ‘scientific’ methodology, Haraway in her valorisation of 
‘being-with’ and Stengers in her insistence of a ‘becoming-with’ attempt to re-incorporate such 
aspects into the methodology of science. While Latimer, this volume, questions the implicit 
totalising involved in such moves, she articulates a more nuanced position in her notion of ‘being 
alongside’. The aim is to make those organizational practices that we call ‘science’ visible. In 
domains in which non-humans are explicitly the focus, the papers by Buller, Candea, Davies, 
Latimer and Whatmore each show how what gets enacted are very complex relations between the 
human and the non-human. They unpick shifts that re-perform the nature-culture dichotomy and 
draw attention to the kinds of science that remain dependent upon asymmetries between subject 
and object. These approaches then do not simply observe scientific practices, they also set out to 
transform the relations between humans and the world that scientific enterprises perform.  
These philosophies proposed by Whatmore, Despret and Latimer of being-with, becoming-with and 
being alongside respectively do not entail standing outside or against science. To the contrary, the 
authors in this volume help us to remember how  we are never without science in our everyday 
lives, neither in terms of our own knowledge creations, nor in respect of those of the scientists we 
study. Their engagement is with a reflexive project concerned to open new ontologies that help us 
rewrite the division between nature and culture and incorporate new ways of understanding the 
relations between the vitality of the material world and the human.  As already indicated this is to 
provoke a way of thinking in sociology that no longer dichotomizes the cultural and the natural (or 
the social and the material), but begins to take more seriously the idea that we live in and are a 
part of naturecultures. For instance, another leading anthropologist of science, Paul Rabinow 
(1992), has pressed attention not to the sociology of biology, as might be expected, but to how we 
need more than ever to think of ourselves and our futures in terms of biosocialities.  
The upshot is to make explicit how scientific practices perform the human and better examine the 
consequences that flow from how the relation between the human and the non-human is being 
constructed. Here Fudge (this volume) beautifully describes the historical slippage of the cow, 
from a being with a face, to a resource, effaced and without dignity.  To this end the papers also 
recognize that the ways in which relations are performed in social science mirror the dominant 
modes of ordering relations in the physical sciences, including all that they cut out (Strathern 
1980) in both theory and practice. As well as focusing on the epistemology-ontology relations in 
the sciences with which they are engaged, Candea, Despret, Latimer, and Whatmore (all in this 
volume) press the importance – substantive and political - of scientists’ attending to their own 
methodologies. This is not only to examine the kinds of knowledges and technologies produced, 
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but also to reflect on how they themselves are rewriting relations between nature and culture, 
body and mind, or people and ecology.  The aim is to finds ways to become more (than) human 
(Whatmore this volume; Seaman 2007). 
 
Concluding commentssions: tTowards a more inclusive science 
The shift in philosophy of science with which the papers that follow are engaged is thus not just 
concerned about bringing the animal and the non-human alongside class, race, and gender to help 
reorder sociology, philosophy and social theory.  Rather, the shift in outlook approach that is being 
encouraged, in both scientific practice and in the epistemology and philosophy of science, extends 
to the part that the non-human plays in the ordering of social relations as well as in the production 
of knowledge.  What the papers explore and propose are different ways not just of investigating 
science as the object of science and technology studies, but how science can be understood and 
done differently.  This is expressed in terms of both how relations are imagined and included in a 
scientific endeavour, particularly in terms of affective interactions between the human and the 
non-human, in the now of the scientific enterprise, but also in terms of how humans live in and 
affect the worlds that they inhabit.   
 
There are three lines of inquiry in the collection.  
The first, sets the scene with papers by Despret, Whatmore and Latimer, who each advocate new 
cosmologies and methodologies, including new epistemology-ontology relations.  The paper by 
Sarah Whatmore explores what happens when methodology incorporates Stenger’s notion of 
becoming-with.  The second, by Vincianne Despret, focuses on the ethologists  who seem to 
search for ‘meanings’ and things that matter and ‘matter most’ to the animals that they study as a 
process of being-with and becoming-with animal. In the third, Latimer offers an extension to 
notions of being-with and becoming-with as too totalizing, and articulates instead a way of seeing 
human-non-human relations as being-alongside.   
 
In these papers attention is dedicated to ways of illuminating and allowing the non-human 
affecting the research, to be made visible as subject and how as well as what knowledge is 
produced.  Stengers and Latour both articulate this in terms of scientific practices that address and 
make visible how and when the so-called ‘objects’ of science object (Pallí Monguilod 2004), in the 
sense of make an objection, to the experiments they are a part of, and through which the 
scientists’ are affected and their understandings, even their modes of experimentation, are 
transformed.  William Boyd offers a wonderful example of just how difficult this is to do in his 
novel Brazzaville beach.  His heroine (Hope Clearwater) a zoologist, through a science of 
correlations rather than measurement alone, attempts to prove to her superiors that the chimps 
they are studying are not just predators and carnivores, as difficult as that was to think in the late 
19th century, but cannibals. But Hope’s fellow scientists cannot allow the objects of their study, a 
half consumed corpse of a baby chimp, affect them and transform their usual categorizations of 
chimps, as too much rests on chimps not being cannibals. 
For scientists to make explicit how let the objects of science both object to and address their 
affects is thus a kind of rigour, a test of the saliency of a scientific practice (see also Davies, Candea 
and Whatmore, this volume). It is not thenThis is not for the authors in this issue a matter of 
simply pointing to the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge, or the ways in which 
culture is already inside science, articulated for example in terms of science’s imaginaries (Verran, 
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2009), as important as these matters are.  Rather it is about understanding how the specificities of 
the relations among the different elements of a scientific endeavour (being assembled, composed 
and imagined, as associations and disassociations), affects a) the kinds of experiments being done, 
b) the interpretations of their significance and c) the knowledge and understandings produced.  In 
this sense what is happening here is to do with a politics of imagination (Latimer and Skeggs 2011): 
specifically, that the ways in which the relations are imagined inside science, particularly over who 
or what is affecting who and what, will change the kind of science being done.   
What is on offer in this volume therefore is notThis then is not simply the kind ofa ‘descriptive’ or 
empirical project advocated by Latour (see also, Krarup and Blok 2011). Rather, for social scientists 
and philosophers of science such as Despret, Stengers and Haraway, engagement with the process 
of science is a matter of activism: a way of affecting how science is done to ensure that it is ‘good’, 
in every sense of the word.  This is not just to admit the contingent, historical, interested and 
localized rather than universal or logical character of science, as if it holds to absolute moral values 
of freedom, objectivity, disinterest, rationality and progress; limited, and bounded by time, space 
and culture (Cunnigham and Williams 1993).  Rather, it is to offer ways of doing science that are 
more inclusive, so that those elements previously excluded and shut out of knowledge enterprises, 
the ‘neglected things’ (Puig de la Bellacasa’s, 2011), will now be included.  This ‘posthuman 
sensibility’ as Braidotti argues (and also Whatmore this volume), points to ‘…a new way of 
combining ethical values with the well-being of an enlarged sense of community, which includes 
one’s territorial or environmental  inter-connections.’ (2013: 190).  
 
 
Understandings of what counts  
Whatmore is concerned to explore the importance of affective relations between different kinds, for 
their methodological as well as their ethical importance.  Focussing on a flood management program in 
which she was a participant researcher, Whatmore emphasises how for Stengers good science is both 
politically and ethically grounded in specific practices.  These practices do not simply involve shifts from 
a scientific method; rather they involve reimagining science as an engagement in relations, relations 
between the human and non-human elements in any given scientific endeavour.  This is because, as she 
states, ‘it is a mistake to posit humanity as somehow separate from, and/or existing prior to, the world 
of things; the human comes into being with this world’ (this volume page **).  Here, good science is not 
just a matter of humans being in relation to non-human elements as objects that he or she observes.  
Rather, it is a matter of recognizing, being open to and even promoting in any research design how 
these relations affect how and what knowledge is produced.   Thus any scientific endeavour is a matter 
of making explicit how different elements affect each other, as a form of becoming-with. Whatmore also 
makes explicit the interested nature of science – that it is neither detached nor disinterested.  Rather, 
making explicit how the concerns and interests in which science is entangled, and which any scientific 
project helps constitute, helps science to become more reflexive and ‘worldly’.    
In her paper Despret describes some of the ‘un-orthodox’ practices pioneered by Konrad Lorenz 
and adopted by ethologists such as Barbara Smuts (2009) and Farley Mowat (1981), who openly 
used their bodies for engaging with the animals they were studying. Despret calls these practices 
‘affected perspectives’, they are perspectives that make explicit what is usually hidden: how the 
scientists’ bodies are affected and changed in their practices. The paper raises questions about 
how scientists mention or conceal their bodies in the conduct of their research, why they do so, 
how they ‘use’ them, and what ‘having a body’ means in relation to scientific work.  Despret offers 
the thesis that using the body as experimental tool (either for a wolf’s diet of mice or for marking a 
territory with urine, as in the case of Mowat’s study of wolves) might help to change the questions 
asked about the animals scientists studied.   
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Despret unfolds a way of doing science that undercuts the usual option of keeping the objects of 
study intact as models of nature through methods of habituation, to show how there are times 
when it is important to become, partially and intermittently, not just with the animal, but to 
become animal.  She describes experiments in which the scientist does not just inhabit the animals 
world, as observer, but allows the animal world to inhabit them: to, after Deleuze, ‘become-animal’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004).  But unlike Deleuze’s emphasis on becoming animal as a becoming 
pack and a line of flight or resistance (see for discussion Latimer this volume), what Despret shows 
us is how the body and practices of the scientist, as they allow the animal world to inhabit them, is 
also treated as an instrument – with the affects of becoming animal observed, measured and 
recorded.    So that through switches in practices, there are switches in attachment – from being 
inside and immersed in the world of the animals being studied, to a world of science that makes 
sense of that immersion through application of its own kinds of belongings and practices – 
measurement and other modes of reporting.  But critically, as Despret stresses the first mode is a 
method, one in which the scientist actively seeks to become like the animals and, critically, she 
shows how for them to affect her to help make her a member, requires participation in their world, 
not detachment.  Unlike in the usual representations of published science, this method is not then 
erased, annulled by the second mode – that of reattaching to modes of science, rather it is made 
explicit as crucial to an adequate epistemology.   
Latimer begins by exploring why it is so important to bring the animal into sociology, particularly 
as the prototype for most forms of Othering.  She reflects upon inquiries into the human and the 
animal for how they critique human exceptionalism, and suggests a movement toward an 
ontology of connection rather than division, that stresses the relation between human and non-
human others.  She shows how in the new evolutionary biologies this connectivity, enacted in 
terms of shared substance, still manages to perform a hierarchy of values through which only 
some animals are brought into the fold of humanity.  She explores a possible way out of this 
impasse as a way of doing human-non-human animal relations in terms of being-with.  Here, 
extending Haraway’s (2003, 2008) theory of Companion Species, Latimer critiques advocacy of 
‘being-with’ as too totalizing and individuating. Drawing on her study of Olivia Musgrave’s 
sculptures of amazonian women and their horses, she goes on to offer a new ethical as well as 
existential understanding of human/non-human animal relations.  Drawing on the work of Marilyn 
Strathern Latimer suggests how being-alongside, as opposed to being-with, emphasises the 
partiality and intermittency of the connection between the human and the non-human, including 
how the human and the non-human animal are different and always in tension.  Thus her focus is 
on how there are neither individuals (humans or non-humans) nor hybrids (companion species) 
but assemblages made up of intermittent and partial connections and attachments.  Her 
philosophy captures how scientists can only ever partially (in every sense of the word) become-
with the animals they study. For instance, Despret’s paper (this volume), shows the scientists 
switching from attachment to the animals’ worlds, back to a reattachment to their own belongings 
of observation and measurement, even of their own faeces, as opposed to that of the objects of 
study. These partial belongings are captured by the notion of being–alongside because it expresses 
the limits and the partialness of any connection and of any sense of mutuality. 
 
This then is not simply a ‘descriptive’ or empirical project.  Rather, for social scientists and 
philosophers of science such as Despret, Stengers and Haraway, engagement with the process of 
science is a matter of activism: a way of affecting how science is done to ensure that it is ‘good’, in 
every sense of the word.  This is not just to admit the contingent, historical, interested and 
localized rather than universal or logical character of science, as if it holds to absolute moral values 
of freedom, objectivity, disinterest, rationality and progress; limited, and bounded by time, space 
and culture (Cunnigham and Williams 1993).  Rather, it is to offer ways of doing science that are 
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more inclusive, so that those elements previously excluded and shut out of knowledge enterprises, 
the ‘neglected things’ (Puig de la Bellacasa’s, 2011), will now be included.  This ‘posthuman 
sensibility’ as Braidotti argues (and also Whatmore this volume), points to ‘…a new way of 
combining ethical values with the well-being of an enlarged sense of community, which includes 
one’s territorial or environmental  inter-connections.’ (2013: 190).  
The claim is that understandings of what counts as ‘good’ science are based upon participation 
with scientists and an unconcealing of how ‘good science’ actually works (see Stengers, 2010 and 
also Thompson, forthcoming).  Moreover, as argued by Despret and Whatmore (this volume), 
show (with Isabelle Stengers) how scientists need to be more ‘response-able’ (Latimer 1999) to 
these affects; response-able for the kinds of worlds they are helping to create and for the 
knowledges that they claim. This is because science is a site of crossing: the ontological-
epistemological relations performed by scientific methods are produced by and reproduce 
particular ethico-political worlds.  The idea underpinning the papers in this collection has been to 
show that attention and concern for making human-non-human relations explicit will help 
produce both better knowledges and better worlds.   
Not only are these aspects of science made invisible in the translation of science into publishable 
science or ‘evidence’, they can be, as Davies this volume,  simply cut out of contemporary forms of 
industrialized ‘big’ experimental science, as if practices and their technicians can be made 
machinelike, with scientists as centred and objective subjects.   
 
The objective overarching aim of the Special issue is thus that these different perspectives might 
not just change how non-humans are seen and involved in the stuff of science in ways that will not 
simply subject them to the ‘anthropological machine’ (Agamben 2004), as spokespersons of 
human’s interests and concerns.  I,  it is also about unconcealing how good science is done. And 
this is a matter of resisting how scientists and science is positioned by the division of the object-
subject divide, through a focus on the affective in the constitution of knowledge (see also Bell 
2012).  That relations between scientists and their objects are affective would have been, until 
recently, almost impossible to think.  It would seem to go against everything that the elaborate 
machine for modern scientific method stands for: objectivity, distantiation, and the elevation of 
technologies that measure, manipulate and intervene.  As we already know, not only are the 
affective aspects of science made invisible in the translation of science into publishable science or 
‘evidence’, they can be, as Davies this volume shows us, simply cut out of contemporary forms of 
industrialized ‘big’ experimental science, as if practices, animals and their technicians can be made 
machinelike, with scientists as centred and objective subjects.   
It is thus in this sense that the papers here contribute to a radical move in the philosophy of 
science: through a turn to a focus on the affective as well as the heterogeneous and distributed 
dimensions of knowledge practices, these new philosophies of science are not just addressing 
ontologies of connectivity, or the decentering of the subject, they are offering possibilities for 
changing the terms of engagement in how science, social or physical, is done. 
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Uggla Y. (2010) What is this thing called 'natural'? The nature-culture divide in climate change and 
biodiversity policy, Journal of Political Ecology, 17, Pp. 79-91.  
Venn, C. (2010) Individuation, Relationality, Affect: Rethinking the Human in Relation to the Living. 
Body & Society March 2010 16: 129-161, 
Verran, H. (2009) Natural Resource Management's 'Nature' and Its Politics. Communication, Politics & 
Culture, 42 (1): 3-18 
Verran, H. (2011) Imagining nature politics in the era of Australia's emerging market in environmental 
services interventions, The Sociological Review, 59(3): 411–431. 
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That relations between scientists and their objects are affective would have been, until recently, 
almost impossible to think.  It would seem to go against everything that the elaborate machine for 
modern scientific method stands for: objectivity, distantiation, and the elevation of technologies 
that measure, manipulate and intervene. Or how the ethologists in Candea’s paper are one minute 
in a relation of collaboration with meerkats, and the next in one of detached observation. These 
partial belongings are captured by the notion of being–alongside because it expresses the limits 
and the partialness of any connection and of any sense of mutuality. 
 
 
 
Science as ‘attached’ 
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The second aim of the papers is to bring to the fore how scientists are not just interested but 
concerned with and by the non-humans in their worlds: that they have to be attached and 
affected, in order for their experiments to work, not all the time but some of the time.  So what 
the papers in this volume address is the need not just to open up social science to thinking with 
the non-human, but the need to reimagine and explore the kinds of worlds that are created by 
how the division between the human and the non-human, scientists and their objects, culture and 
nature are enacted and performed inside scientific endeavours for the kinds of knowledge 
produced. This is important politically and ethically, philosophically and practically.   
As others have shown ‘nature – culture’ is not performed as a binary but as a key dualism that is 
implicated in all the other key divisions underpinning flows of power, including the asymmetrical 
relation between the human and the non-human (Callon 1986).  Thus the nature-culture/non-
human-human dichotomy or dualism does not just make us epistemologically impoverished, 
blinding us to knowledge and understanding, it is the foundation from which processes of 
exclusion flow, and upon which the ‘attitude’ (Foucault 1984) to the ‘non-human’ is founded; an 
attitude that figures the non-human as resource, and as available to mastery (Heidegger 1986) in 
ways that legitimate its exploitation. The scenario is set for what Latour (2004) has called a politics 
of nature, including an ‘ideology of conquest and domination towards nature’ (Pattberg 2007: 1).  
 
Detachment and the subject-object divide 
At the heart of the different philosophies of ‘being-with’, ‘becoming-with’, and ‘being alongside’ 
mentioned earlier is a challenge to the scientific attitude of detachment and, with this, an attempt 
to reverse the exclusions brought about by the subject-object divide. In this respect, a third 
purpose of this Special Issue is to focus on the issue of affect, especially where other sentient 
beings (such as non-human animals and the worlds that they make) are brought alongside humans 
in the creation of knowledge. For all recent attention to the place of the non-human in the 
ordering of social relations is bringing about better understandings of how different human and 
non-human elements are assembled into complex socio-political associations (Latour 2010), it is 
fair to say the focus has been largely on technologies and other materialities. It is only with 
difficulty that more intangible aspects of relations, such as concern, otherness and affect, get re-
admitted to understandings of assemblages and their effects.  
For social theory and methodology, as Verran (2009: 11) argues, this step means that it is not 
enough simply to attend, with, for example, actor network theory, to the place of the non-human 
in the ordering of relations, as a ‘politics of things’. Rather, Verran helps us to see that the 
principles of science need to be extended beyond its own flat ontology, by attending to the 
metaphysical, particularly the moral forms, embedded in and reproduced by specific forms of 
knowledge practice.  There are different ways in which this can be done, for example by attending 
to what it is that scientists care for (Latimer and Puig de la Bellacasa 2013). It is through an ‘ontic 
politics’ that the boundaries of inclusion can be opened to the relational practices through which 
some things rather than others come into existence. In Verran’s case disconcertment, those 
moments when things feel wrong and unsettling, is a part and parcel of what she designates as 
affectual, and, for her, attending to disconcertment is an essential part of doing good (ethically, 
epistemologically) research (see also Law 2010). Krarup and Blok (2011) also aiming to extend 
actor network theory, press for the inclusion of what they designate as ‘quasi-actants’, those non-
empirical or virtual elements, such as symbolic and moral forms, and that have affects on how 
organizing is done.   
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To return for a moment to the discussion of letting the objects of science object above and our 
example drawn from Brazzaville Beach, Hope Clearwater begins to shift her view of the chimp 
communities she is studying but because something in the behaviour of one of the male chimps, 
the disappearance of a pregnant female, and her experience of the dead, half-consumed body of 
the baby chimp is disconcerting.  As such, this is not simply a rigour achieved by a process of 
refutation in Karl Popper’s (1963) sense, because it relies on the scientist being affected by the 
other elements in the composition of the scientific enquiry in ways that move and transform her.   
The papers in the second movement of the collection, including Davies and Candea, examine sites 
of scientific ordering for how they perform non-human/human relations and explore the extent to 
which they can be said to exemplify ‘good’ science, including practices of becoming-with the non-
humans, specifically mice and meerkats.  What emerges in these two papers is complexity in terms 
of very different spaces and organizational forms of science, including the different elements of a 
field station (one where the animals are trained, and the other where these same animals are 
observed as in their natural habitat); and different kinds of laboratory, an ‘industrial’ or ‘functional’ 
laboratory, and the ‘academic’ laboratory.  
What both these authors help us see is how these spaces of science enact different kinds of 
imaginaries and practices, from the functional to the innovative, from the replicative to the 
inquisitive. These shifts in ground make manifest different kinds of relations, including how 
different modes of doing science affect both ways of being with non-human others as well as who 
or what those non-human others are, literally as well as figuratively. What emerges, then, through 
both Davies’ study of mouse models in genetics laboratories and Candea’s study of meerkats and 
an ethology field station, is not simply one way of doing relations between scientists and their 
materials, but shifts, as the ethologists in Candea’s paper are one minute in a relation of 
collaboration with meerkats, and the next in one of detached observation..  Shifts that show that 
each mode of connecting and relating to the objects of science is partial, and intermittent.  They 
help illuminate that scientists are never simply engaged in the making of one world together with 
the other elements in any particular endeavour, but alter between different worlds which have 
different demands and different logics.  These shifts affect the figuring of both the objects of 
science as well as the character of science itself.    
To put it even more strongly, what emerges are shifts between different ways of relating so that 
what comes into view are different kinds of affect.  For example, In Candea’s paper meerkats 
emerge at one moment in their relations with field scientists as ‘collaborators’ and the next as 
these relations change, meerkats are refigured as standing-for nature, a ‘nature’ unadulterated by 
culture, and as such as available to the detached and disinterested scientific gaze to be observed 
and measured.  For Davies, inbred mice, and their genetically altered offspring, have attained a 
very special universality and a profound imbroglio in biomedical research practices with their 
adoption into international scientific networks as ‘an ordinary commodity in the exchange circuits 
of transnational capital [...] a scientific instrument for sale like many other laboratory devices’ 
(Haraway, 1997: 79)’ (this issue, page ***). This is a particular way of what Haraway has called 
‘becoming worldly’, as mice developed in one laboratory become standardized technical tools that 
move from research centres to specialised laboratory suppliers, to become the patented property 
of international biotechnology. In Davies’ account, ‘Mice are part of the story through which 
biology becomes molecular, genetic life commodified and genetic explanations fetishized’ (this 
volume, page **). However Davies’ paper is also about how these non-human others, these 
laboratory mice, affect scientific knowledge.  Specifically, she shows how technicians and scientists 
deal with the unexpected creatures in their work.  These are the spontaneous mutations in the 
mouse house, figured in their stories as deviant, mutant, virgin, and rogue mice. Davies explores 
when the animal caretakers are able to see their biological potential, these new guests in the 
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mouse house can facilitate the emergence of a useful new strain of research animal; but when the 
animals have are not seen as having potential because they have no interesting new features, they 
are killed.  But the subject-object divide is of course not peculiar to science. Its origins lie more in a 
grammatical division in language between subject, which does the doing and object, to which 
things are done, including observation, experimentation and measurement. The division thus 
typically separates those beings accorded the honour to be sentient (generally those humans 
accorded the status of sovereign subjects) from those which are not (generally non-humans). 
Consequently, in a sleight of the English language, it is worth noting that objects are generally 
taken as being moved about by effects and only subjects – typically humans - are seen as subject 
to affect. However, the rise of science might have had as much influence in practice over usage of 
these twin terms.  
 
Discontinuities and shifts in relations 
This leads to the third line of inquiry in the collection, including papers by Buller and Fudge, that 
explore the disconnections, discontinuities and the shifts in relations between human and non-
human others for the kinds of worlds they bring into being.  Fudge addresses the constructed 
discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals by referring to the ‘facelessness’ of 
animals in Western philosophy and modern science (Bacon) because ‘a face is where the 
rationality that lies within is projected out into the world, and here there is no reason to project 
and so no face’. As Fudge carries on  ‘Lack of reason means lack of face, means lack of individuality, 
lack of home, which in turn means that these beings are outside of full ethical consideration.’ (this 
volume, page **).  
In a Baumanesque (1990) analysis of effacement,  Fudge’s aim is to uncover human/nonhuman 
relations in the past that do not repeat all the assumptions and ‘fantasies of disembodiment and 
autonomy’ (Wolfe  2010, p. xv) of humanist thinking.  So her paper is about recovering and 
acknowledging the existence of another past, one that contemplates alternative (better?) ways of 
being in the world with nonhuman animals.   Her search is based on the recovery of 
human/nonhuman animal relations from an archival study of people relations with and 
understanding of the role of their livestock in  early modern England. In the examined wills Fudge 
uncovers the clues, such as the naming of specific animals, that might be intimations of a different 
type of relations between human and nonhumans, one in which nonhuman animals might have 
been considered subjects with a ‘face’, entitled to ethical considerations. Thus by giving animals a 
face, by individuating them as subjects, they can be reincluded in the fold of humanity 
The ‘effacement of the face’ (Bauman, 1990) of farm animals is also a theme present Buller’s 
paper. But in contrast to Fudge, for Buller giving an animal a (humanized) face is a part of the 
problem.  He argues that simply giving animals an individuated identity, is an effect of the 
anthropological machinery of animal welfare science.  Specifically, Buller points out how the 
‘singular ‘farm’ is increasingly a place of ever‐greater multitudes, a deceptive and porous whole 
that is, in so many ways, very much less than the sum of its constituent parts’ (this volume, page 
**). His analysis of the industrialization of animal farming and the problems emerging from the 
ever greater number of animals kept for food production (Fraser, 2006) is linked to the rise of the 
public concern for the welfare of farmed animals and the development of animal welfare science. 
Buller proposes a critique of the recent ‘feeling’ approach in animal welfare science (see Duncan, 
2004) that is based on an appraisal of the emotional state (e.g. happiness, fear, boredom) of 
individual animals.  He points out how this approach, that is met with favour by the public (see 
Miele 2011) is too individuating.  It is also for Buller a decoy that obfuscates the need to 
investigate animal ‘collectivities’, and the very conditions of life of the ever larger flocks of 
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chickens, herds of cows or ‘cities’ of salmons, and how their ‘wants’ or ‘feelings’ are emerging 
from the interaction between them and the environment in which they live.  Buller concludes that: 
..these ‘animals’ wants’ (as opposed to ‘needs’) are increasingly being understood as socially 
contextualised, rather than purely individual yet they are not only increasingly denied within 
modern animal husbandry practice but also escape scientific investigation and consideration. 
(this volume page **) 
As Despret (2012 and this volume) has argued, for addressing animals ‘wants’ the real challenge is 
to ask ‘interesting’ questions, which is questions that interest them, and are not generated by an 
‘anthropomorphic’ imagination of what is important for non-human animals. As Buller concludes, 
in many contexts, farm animals ‘want to be with each other even, in some cases, at the moment of 
their ending’ (this volume, page **). 
As with previous papers in Theory, Culture & Society (see for example, Ruddick 2010) Spinoza’s 
sense of affect is invoked by a number of papers as moments in which there is ‘an alteration in 
power by affectus’ and it is likely no accident that those interested in affect have returned to a 
philosopher dating back to a time before science became the dominant force in the expansion of 
knowledge. This is because affectus is defined by Spinoza as ‘the affections of the body by which 
the body’s power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the 
ideas of these affections’ (Spinoza, 1994). Inasmuch as the reductionism inherent in Cartesian 
methodologies tends to cut the ‘whole’ into ‘parts’, the rise of science has contributed to an 
effacement of the very kind of attachments to which Spinoza is pointing with his term affections.  
Much has been said in the literature about the way in which science has focused on the ‘efficient’ 
cause and relegated Aristotle’s other three causes (material, set-up and final cause) to the dustbin. 
This is a straightforward consequence of the mode of reductive analysis, which (in breaking down 
the whole) ‘detaches’ each part from the other in order to form clear and distinct ‘simples’. Equal 
attention though might be given to an evisceration of the notion of affect from scientific language, 
whereby it is only the ‘effect’ of one part on another that is studied. In a circular fashion, since 
effects alone are understood to be measurable, this predilection is largely attributable to the 
importance of measurement in science.  
The mode of detachment takes the subject-object division one step further through an all-
embracing denial of affect in the work of scientists. In what is tantamount to a ‘cutting’ of the 
network (Strathern 1996), the ‘true scientist’ is incited to banish all relations other than that of 
measurement. In ways that resonate with the discredited doctrine of logical positivism (which 
sought to banish meaning as metaphysics), the more positivist scientist is not only in hock to what 
can be measured, but holds out observations (measurements) as purified of any ‘subjective’ affect. 
Since it is only the objects in an experiment that are deemed to be movable, only the effects on 
the objects are measured. Paradoxically, the same objects are sometimes also discussed as the 
‘subjects’ of the experiment – as if the experiment has not only taken the place of sentient beings 
but becomes itself the prime mover.  
 
 
Crossing the subject-object divide   
In all this stress on ‘objectivity’, measurement procedures in science open up a front door 
whereby those humans who do not conform to scientific protocols are taken to be ‘irrational’ and 
passed over to the other side of the subject-object divide, thus becoming ‘objects’ of study for the 
human sciences. Yet, if on a somewhat different token, measurement also opens up the back door 
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through which non-humans cross over the subject-object divide. In an enslavement to their 
instruments and their tried and test protocols, scientists are bound by their conventions to go with 
the measurements, it is not the scientists that first register and record but their instruments – the 
non-humans that are seen to be aligned on the same side of the subject-object divide as the 
scientists.  
These procedures might cause little reflection but for the fact that increasingly, in fields such as 
genetic biomedical research, it is sentient beings – animals going ahead of humans – that have 
become the instruments. Here, Davies and Candea (this volume) both describe how different 
scientists’ ‘model’ animals, to a greater and lesser extent, so that the animals are affected by 
culture (to a greater or lesser extent). As such they can no longer stand for nature. But these same 
animals (genetically engineered mice, and collaborative meerkats) then become the instruments 
through which scientific experiments are conducted, but with the trace of their humanization 
erased (Derrida 1978). Thus scientists switch between the making of their animals fit for their 
experiments and the inclusion of the animal as scientific instrument.  Without wishing to labour 
the point, even in the so-called hard sciences of biology and chemistry, the registers of affect have 
been busy re-entering by the back door. Elsewhere in her study of genetic medicine Latimer (2013) 
explores this motility in the subject-object divide.   
But, as Candea (this volume) helps remind us the objects of science are not the materials and 
creatures that the scientists employ and study in their experiments.  The materials and creatures 
scientists use in their experiments are constituted discursively as models and instruments, 
employed in experiments to help extend, confirm or refute particular puzzles, hypotheses and 
theories: it is the puzzles, the theories and the hypotheses themselves that are science’s objects.  
What he shows is how the instruments, the meerkats, also have to become participants for the 
experiment.  What these new ontologies explored in this special issue are provoking, then, is 
attention to how the creatures and the instruments are not just that, instruments, but participants 
in the worlds of knowledge that they inhabit in ways that affect the knowledge produced because 
they affect what the humans think and do.   
Each paper in their different ways explores how the relations between the human and the 
nonhuman (including animals, microbes, tissues, air and water) affect processes and practices not 
just in the creation of socialities (Carter & Charles 2011a, b), but also in the production of scientific 
knowledge and understanding.  Like Munro and Belova1 (2009) affect is being understood not so 
much in its modern sense as emotion or sentiment.  Rather what is being invoked by a turn to 
affect is attention to how shifts occur as a power effect, a power effect that flows from being 
moved. Here, there is an affinity between the sense of affect being invoked and that which is 
emergent in social psychological explorations which contrast feeling and affect, the former being 
individuated and the latter being both embodied and relational:  
Where  feeling  is often used to refer to phenomenological or subjective experiences,  affect 
is often taken to refer to a force or intensity that can belie the movement of the subject who 
is always in a process of becoming. Becoming is a concept that has been mobilised across the 
humanities to refer to the subject’s capacity to affect and be affected (Latour, 2004; 
Braidotti, 2002). Although affects might traverse individual subjects, for many scholars they 
undo the notion of a singular or sovereign subject. (Blackman and Cromby, 2007, p.5) 
Thus the papers here presented stress attention to how in scientific practices as well as in 
everyday life it is also the human-non-human relations that are affective; it is these that move, 
incite, elicit and excite.  Puig de la Bellacasa (2011) argues for the importance of disentangling 
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matters of fact and socio-technical assemblages as more than matters of interest, or even as a 
politics of things, but as matters of care.  She suggests that attending to matters of care in 
technoscientific practices helps to foreground attention to those “neglected things” that are made 
invisible by the usual ways in which scientific endeavours are represented.   Here, then, taking 
account of the affective dimensions of science is not a matter of simply reducing these affects to 
the status of ‘not mind’, as moments of precognition or non-representation (Thrift 2007), because 
– as we have already explored above in our discussion of Strathern and naturecultures -, we are 
never out of culture.  Rather, the aim, is to make explicit how scientists are affected by the non-
humans and quasi-actants that make up the worlds they inhabit. M and, moreover, with Isabelle 
Stengers, as argued by Despret and Whatmore argue (this volume), show with Isabelle Stengers 
how scientists need to be more ‘response-able’ (Latimer 1999) to these affects; response-able, for 
the kinds of worlds they are helping to create and for the knowledges that they claim. This is 
because science is a site of crossing: the ontological-epistemological relations performed by 
scientific methods are produced by and reproduce particular ethico-political worlds.  The idea 
underpinning the papers in this collection has been to show that attention and concern for making 
human-non-human relations explicit will help produce both better knowledges and better worlds.   
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